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Application of the Abstention Doctrine
to Inverse Condemnation Actions in
Federal Court
JOHN T. HARRIS*
INTRODUCTION
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
hibits the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. This restriction is made applicable to the states by
the fourteenth amendment prohibition against the deprivation
of property without due process of law.' Since a federal question
is presented, it would seem to be beyond dispute that an action
for just compensation resulting from the taking of private prop-
erty for public use would lie in the federal courts.2 A recent line of
* The author is a partner in the Los Angeles law firm of Pollock, Williams
and Berwanger, received a B.S.E. from Princeton University in 1964, and a J.D.
from the University of Wisconsin Law School in 1967. He is a member of both the
Wisconsin and California Bars.
1. United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943); Appleby v. City of Buffalo,
221 U.S. 524 (1911); and Chicago B & Q R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
2. Jurisdiction in a case alleging the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation is ordinarily obtained under the Federal Question
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). In addition, federal jurisdiction can be invoked by
reason of 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) providing federal jurisdiction for actions brought
cases, however, has invoked the little-known doctrine of absten-
tion as an effective bar to the adjudication of such cases in the
federal courts.
The abstention doctrine, while recognizing the proper invoca-
tion of federal jurisdiction, permits a federal district court, in
narrowly limited "special circumstances, ' 3 to postpone the exer-
cise of its jurisdiction pending the resolution of so-called "state
issues" in state courts. This application of the doctrine contem-
plates that the district court will retain jurisdiction over "federal
issues" so that, if such issues remain upon final determination of
the state issues in the state courts, the federal court will exercise
its jurisdiction to adjudicate them. In a more drastic application
of the abstention doctrine, the federal district court may simply
refuse to exercise its jurisdiction and dismiss the case.
Application of the abstention doctrine in cases alleging the
taking of private property for public use without just compensa-
tion has become particularly important in the last year due to the
intervention of the Attorney General of the State of California as
amicus curiae on behalf of local municipalities in several federal
actions involving such issues.4 The essence of the Attorney Gen-
eral's position is that
legal disputes arising from the exercise of the state's police power
control of land use [should] be decided promptly by the state courts
who are familiar with the complex regulatory scheme of land use
controls in California.5
under the Civil Rights Act, usually §§ 1983(1970) and 1985(3) of 42 U.S.C. (1970). In
limited situations diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) is also
available.
3. See Lake Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498,509(1972); Zwickler
v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967); and Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S.
185, 188 (1959).
4. Amicus curiae briefs have been filed by the State Attorney General in
M.J. Brock & Sons, Inc. v. City of Davis, 401 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Cal. 1975);
Sederquist v. City of Tiburon (N.D. Cal., C 75 0297 RHS); Gariffo v. City of
Tiburon (N.D. Cal., C 75 0296 RHS); Maun v. City of Sacramento (E.D. Cal., s 74
571 TJM); Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 390 F. Supp. 1004
(C.D. Cal. 1975); and Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista (S.D.
Cal., Civ. No. 76-0024-E). In the Maun, Rancho Palos Verdes Corporation and
Santa Fe Land Improvement cases, the district court abstained. The Rancho
Palos Verdes decision was recently affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit on Pullman grounds. In Brock, the court reached a contrary
decision, questioning the ruling in Rancho Palos Verdes. In American Say. and
Loan Assn. v. County of Marin (N.D. Cal., C 74 2435 ACW), and Arastra Limited
Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975) the district court
refused to apply the abstention doctrine. However, in the last two cases the
Attorney General did not file an amicus brief.
5. Amicus Curiae Brief of the People of the State of California in Support
of Appellee and Cross-Appellant City of Laguna Beach, et al., p. 2, submitted in
Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, docketed, No. 75-1813,
Cross-Appeal docketed, No. 75-2193 (C.A. 9th).
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It appears that the Attorney General's objective in seeking appli-
cation of the abstention doctrine in federal cases involving in-
verse condemnation issues is to seek the forum most favorable to
the governmental entities involved.6 While the Attorney Gener-
al's efforts to direct all inverse condemnation cases out of the
federal courts and into the state courts is understandable, famil-
iarity with state law should not be sufficient justification for
application of the abstention doctrine. As will be discussed more
fully below, the abstention doctrine should be applied only in
certain limited situations justifying the delay and expense inher-
ent in such a ruling. By these standards, the cases in which the
Attorney General has requested the federal courts to abstain are
not appropriate for the application of the doctrine.
THE PULLMAN DOCTRINE
Any discussion of the abstention doctrine must begin with
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Company.7 This case
involved a challenge to an order of the Texas Railroad Commis-
sion that all sleeping cars operated in Texas must be in the charge
of a pullman conductor. This ruling had a discriminatory effect
because blacks were excluded from consideration for positions
as conductors. The order was attacked on the grounds that it was
unauthorized under Texas law and that it violated the commerce,
due process and equal protection clauses of ths federal constitu-
tion. A three-judge district court held that the Texas statute
which gave the Commission power over railroads and which
made it the duty of the Commission to correct and prevent
abuses in the conduct of the business of such railroads did not
authorize the Commission to issue the order as the correction of
an "abuse;" therefore, the court enjoined enforcement of the
Commission's order.
8
On direct review, the Supreme Court held, in an opinion by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, that the district court should have ab-
6. Compare Selby Realty Company v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d
110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973), and H.F.H. Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15
Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975), with Dahl v. City of Palo Alto,
372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974), and Arastra Limited Partnership v. City of Palo
Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
7. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
8. Pullman Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Texas, 33 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Tex
1940).
stained from deciding the case.9 The Court was concerned that
the Texas Supreme Court had not ruled on the authority of the
Commission to issue the order in question. Since the ultimate
determination of the authority of the Texas Railroad Commis-
sion would have to be made by Texas courts, any judgment of the
federal district court as to the extent of the Commission's author-
ity would necessarily be "a forecast rather than a determina-
tion."'10 Since a decision by Texas courts could render moot the
constitutional issues which provided the basis for federal juris-
diction, Justice Frankfurter concluded that the district court
should have abstained from exercising its jurisdiction pending
state court determination of the underlying state issue.11 If feder-
al questions still remained upon resolution of that issue, return to
the federal courts would be appropriate.
Subsequent applications of the Pullman doctrine by the
United States Supreme Court have reaffirmed the basic require-
ments of (1) an unclear issue of state law, and (2) the possibility
that state adjudication of that issue could avoid the necessity of
reaching the federal question. 12 If a state court decision on the
underlying question of state law can substantially modify the
constitutional questions, and the state issues are unclear, absten-
tion is also justified under the Pullman doctrine. 3
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
enumerated the elements necessary for application of the Pull-
man abstention doctrine as follows:
(1) The complaint "touches a sensitive area of social policy upon
which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alternative to its
adjudication is open."
(2) "Such constitutional adjudication plainly can be avoided if a de-
finitive ruling on the state issue would terminate the controversy."
(3) The possibly determinative issue of state law is doubtful. 4
One of the features of Pullman abstention is the retention by
the federal district court of jurisdiction over the federal issues
pending determination of the state issues by the state courts. This
9. Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
10. Id. at 499.
11. Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941).
12. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S.
800 (1976); Lake Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); Askew v.
Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Spector
Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944). See also Field, Abstention
in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1071, 1084-1101 (1974); Pell, Abstention-A Primrose Path by Any
Other Name, 21 De Paul L. Rev. 926 (1972); Wright, Law of Federal Courts (2d ed.
1973).
13. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1964).
14. Canton v. Spokane School District 81, 498 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1974).
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amounts to a recognition that the jurisdiction of the federal court
has been properly invoked but that, at least with respect to
certain issues in the case, the state courts are the more appropri-
ate forum for their adjudication.1 5 Thus, an action brought in a
federal court may, through application of the Pullman doctrine,
be "stayed" pending state court determination of the "unclear
state issues." After this time-consuming determination, which
could entail an appeal to the highest state court, the action is
returned to the federal court for adjudication of any remaining
federal issues. The delay inherent in such a system is obvious.
There are instances of cases bouncing between state and federal
courts for periods of up to ten years.16 Recognizing that applica-
tion of the Pullman abstention doctrine can lead to such exces-
sive delays, the Supreme Court has suggested that where delay
would work an undue hardship, the doctrine should not be
applied. 17
A litigant denied access to the federal courts until resolution of
state issues in the state courts will certainly be tempted, due to
considerations of time and money, to resolve all issues in the state
courts. If, however, both state and federal issues are unreserved-
ly submitted to the state courts for decision and are there liti-
gated, under what is known as the England8 doctrine, a litigant
will be unable to reapply to the federal court for adjudication of
the federal issues even if that court has retained jurisdiction over
such issues.' 9
THIBODAUX, BURFORD AND YOUNGER
Abstention is also deemed appropriate in cases involving "dif-
ficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of sub-
stantial public import whose importance transcends the result in
the case then at bar."20 This application is drawn primarily from
15. Harris County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77 (1975); Zwickler
v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
16. See C. Clark, Federal Procedural Reform and States Rights; To a More
Perfect Union, 40 Texas L. Rev. 211 (1961), C. Wright, The Abstention Doctrine
Reconsidered, 37 Texas L. Rev. 815 (1959).
17. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 537 (1965); England v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 418 (1964).
18. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411(1964).
19. Id.
20. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. at
814.
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux 21 and Bur-
ford v. Sun Oil Co. 22 An examination of the cases upon which this
doctrine is based gives some insight into its scope and
applicability.
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux 23 was a
diversity suit originally brought in the Louisiana state courts but
subsequently removed to the United States district court. The
City of Thibodaux, relying upon an act adopted in 1900, sought to
condemn poles, lines and other portions of the Louisiana Power
& Light Co. system which serviced a newly annexed section of
the city. The power company challenged the authority of the city
to condemn only a portion of a utility system.24 The statute upon
which the city relied had never been judicially interpreted, but
had been the subject of an opinion of the Attorney General of
Louisiana in which it was concluded, in a strikingly similar case,
that a Louisiana city did not have the power being asserted by the
City of Thibodaux. The district court, on its own motion, stayed
further proceedings pending a Louisiana state court decision on
the interpretation of the expropriation statute in question. On
appeal to the Supreme Court, the district court ruling was af-
firmed because (1) eminent domain is "intimately involved with
sovereign prerogative" and (2) the question of Louisiana law
involved was unclear and thus a federal ruling could not be
determinative. 25
The similarity between the Thibodaux and Pullman decisions
is readily apparent; however, in Thibodaux there was no con-
stitutional issue which could be avoided or modified by a state
court interpretation of some underlying issue of state law. The
case, therefore, does not fit into the classic Pullman mold, in
spite of the fact that the Court clearly placed great reliance upon
Pullman.
In addition to its discussion of Pullman and its principles, the
Court noted the intimate involvement of the power of eminent
domain with sovereign prerogative. In Thibodaux a decision by
a federal court would have had the effect of interpreting an
unclear Louisiana law and thus determining, at least in federal
courts, when and how this power could be exercised. The Su-
preme Court stated:
21. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
22. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
23. 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
24. See the factual discussion in the district court opinion, 153 F. Supp. 515
(1957).
25. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25,30 (1959).
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The special nature of eminent domain justifies a district judge, when
his familiarity with the problems of local law so counsels him, to
ascertain the meaning of a disputed state statute from the only tribunal
empowered to speak definitively-the courts of the state under whose
statute eminent domain is sought to be exercised-rather than force
himself into a dubious and tentative forecast.
2
Another case cited by the Supreme Court in Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. United States27 as supporting
Thibodaux type abstention is Kaiser Steel Corporation v. W. S.
Ranch Co.28 Like Thibodaux, this was a diversity case involving
an interpretation of state law which would have far-reaching
consequences. In the Kaiser Steel case, the question was
whether water rights which had been granted by the state were
available for use by a private individual. This, in turn, involved
the interpretation of the term "public use" in the New Mexico
state constitution. The court noted that:
The state law issue which is crucial in this case is one of vital concern
in the arid state of New Mexico where water is one of the most valuable
natural resources. The issue, moreover, is a truly novel one. The ques-
tion will eventually have to be resolved before the New Mexico courts,
and since a declaratory judgment action is actually pending there, in all
likelihood that resolution will be forthcoming soon.
2
Thus, in both the Thibodaux and Kaiser Steel cases, difficult
and unclear issues of state law were raised involving fundamen-
tal state policies.30
Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,31 the second case upon which the
Thibodaux-Burford doctrine is based, involved an attack on the
validity of an order of the Texas Railroad Commission granting
Burford the right to drill four wells in the East Texas oil field.
Jurisdiction of the court was 1redicated upon both diversity of
26. Id. at 29.
27. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S.
800 (1976).
28. 391 U.S. 593 (1968).
29. Id. at 594.
30. In the Colorado River Water Conservation District case, the Supreme
Court appears to retreat from the much broader interpretation of Thibodaux set
forth in a previous, though recent, decision. In Harris County Commissioner's
Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83-84 (1975), the Court cited Thibodaux for the
proposition that " . . . when the state law questions have concerned matters
peculiarly within the province of the local courts [citations], we have inclined
toward abstention." This statement was in the nature of dicta, however, and in
Colorado River Water Conservation District the Court substantially narrowed
the permissible application of Thibodaux.
31. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
citizenship and the federal question raised by allegations of the
denial of due process of law. The Commission was responsible
for regulating the location and size of oil wells in the various
Texas oil fields. Such regulation was needed to ensure continued
oil field productivity-which productivity would be threatened
by the presence of too many wells in a particular field or by
unregulated pumping at too great a rate. Sun Oil Co. challenged
the Commission's order granting drilling rights to Burford, alleg-
ing that such wells would severely diminish Sun Oil's ability to
recover oil.
In effect, Sun Oil was requesting the federal court to review the
reasonableness of the Commission's decision, a process which
would have required the court to review a multitude of complex
and unfamiliar factors. The Supreme Court dealt extensively
with the vast potential for waste of an essential resource as a
result of conflicting state and federal decisions which could
upset the delicate balance necessary to achieve optimum utiliza-
tion of that resource. To avoid conflicting decisions within the
state, Texas had established a system of review whereby all
Commission orders could be appealed to a single district court
and then to the Texas Supreme Court. Therefore, this district
court had a thorough understanding of the complex issues relat-
ing to oil and gas preservation. The Supreme Court concluded
that such a central system for the determination of issues arising
from the administration of the oil and gas reserves was essential
to prevent undue waste. Emphasizing the adequacy of the rem-
edy available to plaintiff in the state court, the Supreme Court
ordered the lower federal court to decline to exercise jurisdiction
and dismiss the action.
Similarly, in Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern
Railway Company32 abstention was ordered to permit state
courts to determine whether the railroad could legally discon-
tinue service to certain municipalities. The need for some form of
service to outlying communities and the overall transportation
needs of the state counselled such a decision. As in Burford,
appeals from decisions of the Public Service Commission re-
garding the discontinuance of service were made to a single state
circuit court.
Burford abstention has been characterized by the Supreme
Court as follows:
In some cases, however, the state question itself need not be deter-
minative of state policy. It is enough that exercise of federal review of
32. 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
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the question in the case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state
efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of sub-
stantial public concern.
33
Thus, in Burford and Alabama Public Service Commission, the
emphasis was to avoid disruption of some overriding state pol-
icy; however, in both cases, it is important to note that the policy
in question was of such great importance to the state that a single
court of review was established to ensure consistent policy.
One important distinction between the Pullman doctrine and
the Thibodaux-Burford doctrine is that under Pullman the court
retains jurisdiction over the federal issues and does not dismiss
the case. Under the Thibodaux-Burford doctrine, however, the
Court will dismiss the case in some instances. This drastic ap-
proach has only been applied thus far in Burford and Alabama
Public Service type cases.
A third form of abstention, known as the Younger doctrine,
arises out of the Supreme Court decision in Younger v. Harris
34
which directs abstention "where, absent bad faith, harrassment,
orl patently invalid state statute, federal jurisdiction has been
invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal proceed-
ings. '35 This abstention doctrine is based upon the "traditional
reluctance of courts of equity, even within a unitary system, to
interfere with a criminal prosecution." 36 It has been applied in
civil proceedings only when such proceedings can be charac-
terized as being "more akin to a criminal prosecution than are
most civil cases. '37 The Supreme Court has specifically refused
to make any general pronouncements about the applicability of
the Younger doctrine to all civil litigation.38
INVERSE CONDEMNATION ACTION ABSTENTION
Application of the abstention doctrine in any of its various
33. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. at
814.
34. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
35. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. at
816.
36. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975).
37. Id. See also Owens v. Housing Authority of City of Stamford, 394 F.
Supp. 1266 (D. Conn. 1975).
38. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 (1975). However, the doctrine
has been used in at least one land use decision. Olinger v. City of Palm Springs,
386 F. Supp. 1376 (1975). This decision precedes Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., how-
ever, and would not seem consistent with that case.
forms to federal actions alleging inverse condemnation would
not ordinarily seem justified. The "paradigm" case for the appli-
cation of the Pullman doctrine arises when a state statute is
susceptible to an interpretation which can avoid or substantially
modify the federal constitutional questions presented. 9 For ex-
ample, abstention has been justified under Pullman when a state
pollution control act under constitutional attack might not have
prohibited the discharge of sewage from a watercraft allegedly
violating the act,40 or a challenged administrative order might
not have been authorized under the applicable state law.4 In
most cases alleging inverse condemnation, however, no interpre-
tation of state law can avoid or modify the constitutional issues
presented. In these cases jurisdiction is predicated upon the
Federal Question Statute.42 Although state "taking" issues are
frequently included in the federal complaint, these issues are
joined under the federal court's pendent jurisdiction. The pri-
mary question in these cases is whether certain actions of local
government have so limited the use of the complaining party's
property as to constitute inverse condemnation. There is no
question in such cases of lack of validity or authorization for
such acts. Such issues are immaterial for even if the acts alleged
to constitute a taking were unauthorized or otherwise invalid
under the applicable state law, they have nevertheless taken
place. The only issue requiring resolution is whether the acts ape
sufficient to constitute a taking under the fifth or fourteenth
amendments.43
39. Lake Carriers Ass'n v. MacMullen, 406 U.S. 498, 510 (1972).
40. Id.
41. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Company 312 U.S. 496(1941).
42. See note 2, supra.
43. See Ballard Fish & Oyster Co. v. Glaser Construction Co., 424 F.2d 473,
474-75 (4th Cir. 1970); Lerner v. Town of Islip, 272 F. Supp. 664, 667 (E. D. N.Y.
1967); Steel Hill Development Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 355 F. Supp. 947, 952
(D.N.H. 1971); Eleopoulos v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency, 351 F. Supp. 63,
64 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
In Ballard Fish, plaintiff brought an action against Commonwealth Natural
Gas Corporations alleging, inter alia, that the State of Virginia's grant of a
certificate of convenience and necessity to lay and maintain a gas pipeline across
the James River, the authorization of Commonwealth as a public corporation to
exercise the state's power of eminent domain, and Comnonwealth's subsequent
occupancy of plaintiff's oyster bed without instituting condemnation proceed-
ings or obtaining an easement "constituted an unlawful taking of private proper-
ty without just compensation in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at
474.
The Court commented:
The fact that Commonwealth occupied Ballard's oyster beds without
first acquiring an easement either through grant or by condemnation is
irrelevant. Its occupancy, though gained through misuse of the power
granted it to acquire easements, is nonetheless action taken under color
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Applying this logic, federal district courts have refused to
apply the abstention doctrine.
In M.J. Brock & Sons, Inc. v. City of Davis,44 the landowner
alleged that the city council, planning commission, planning
director, and individuals associated with these agencies had
"engaged in a series of acts which collectively have denied plain-
tiff of the lawful use of its land. 45
Plaintiff alleged violations of the fifth and fouteenth amend-
ments, denial of due process, equal protection, and privileges
and immunities, as well as violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C.
1983 and 1985. Also alleged were state law causes of action based
on misrepresentation, breach of contract and inverse
condemnation.
The court, in denying defendant's request that it abstain from
exercising federal jurisdiction, held that since the case did not
fall within the dictates of the Pullman or Burford doctrines,
there was no valid reason to do so. 46 The court said:
[T]he question whether there has been an unconstitutional taking
under the Fifth Amendment in the instant action would not be an-
swered by a resolution of the state claims; therefore abstention is
inappropriate here because the controversy would not be terminated.47
Donohoe Construction Company, Inc. v. Maryland-National
Capital Park and Planning Commission48 and Rasmussen v.
City of Lake Forest, Illinois49 presented situations in which
federal courts were requested to abstain on grounds that the
constitutional questions raised could be obviated by interpreta-
tion of the state constitutional provision involved. Both courts
declined, reasoning that abstention was unwarranted "when it
would merely permit the state court to consider the state counter-
part of a federal constitutional claim."50
of state law. (Ballard Fish & Oyster Co. v. Glaser Construction Co., 424
F.2d 473, 474-75 (4th Cir. 1970).
See also Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 287 (1913).
44. 401 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Cal. 1975).
45. Id. at 356.
46. M. J. Brock & Sons, Inc. v. City of Davis, 401 F. Supp. 354, 357-58 (E.D.
Cal. 1975).
47. Id. at 358.
48. 398 F. Supp. 21 (D. Md. 1975).
49. 404 F. Supp. 148 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
50. Donohoe Construction Company, Inc. v. Maryland, National-Capital
Park Planning Commission, 398 F. Supp. 21, 29-30 (D. Md. 1975); Rasmussen v.
City of Lake Forest Illinois, 404 F. Supp. 148, 153 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
In Rasmussen, the court distinguished Rancho Paolos Verdes
Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach,5 where abstention was based
upon the "complex California scheme of land-use control, much
of which [had] not yet been interpreted by state courts. '5 2
In ruling out Thibodaux-Burford abstention, the court noted
that the instant case presented "no complex of unconstrued
Illinois land use law whose construction would obviate this dis-
pute," 53 nor did the Illinois law "appear to coordinate the zoning
ordinances or municipalities toward any particular state
objectives. 54
Two recent federal court of appeals decisions have concluded,
however, that abstention is appropriate in cases involving allega-
tions of a taking for public use without just compensation. In
Fralin and Waldron, Inc. v. City of Martinsville, Va.,55 the alle-
gations of a taking were based upon the refusal of the city to issue
a special use permit. The court concluded that a decision by the
state courts could modify the constitutional issues or at least
present them in a different posture by interpreting the city
ordinance in light of pertinent state law.56 In Muskegon Theatres,
Inc. v. City of Muskegon, 7 the complaint alleged that certain
urban renewal activities had amounted to the taking of plaintiff's
leasehold interest. In that case, the court concluded that a state
court determination of state issues could avoid an unnecessary
and premature decision of federal constitutional issues. 8
51. Rancho Palos Verdes Corporation v. City of Laguna Beach, et. al., 390 F.
Supp. 1004 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
52. Id. at 1006.
53. Rasmussen v. City of Laks Forest Illinois, 404 F. Supp. 148,154 (N.D. Ill.
1975).
54. Id.
55. 370 F. Supp. 185 (W.D. Va. 1973), affd. 493 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1973).
Plaintiff, a Virginia real estate development corporation, had submitted to the
City of Martinsville, Virginia, a request for a special use permit to build apart-
ment dwellings pursuant to the Housing and Development Act of 1968. HUD had
already approved the construction plans and committee $1,771,200.00 in par-
ticipating federal funds to the project. Refusal by the city to grant plaintiff's
application was contested as an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of local
authority because it rendered the policy of the United States Government,
embodied in the act, subservient to city ordinances which effectively thwarted
that policy.
It was argued that local land-use law could possibly be construed to find that
the action taken by the city was in excess of its avowed discretion and thereby
moot the constitutional questions.
56. Id. at 191.
57. 507 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1974). The basis of plaintiff's allegation was the
city's delay in assessing his leasehold interest, as prescribed by the applicable
ordinance, until renovations had been commenced. This practice resulted in
depressed property values. However, resort to state authority could initiate
repudiation of the ordinance.
58. Id. at 205.
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While the courts in both cases relied heavily on Pullman-type
abstention principles, in neither case did the court describe just
how a state court determination could avoid or modify the under-
lying constitutional issues. 9 It would seem that the courts were
manufacturing a justification for abstention based upon a belief
that the issues were more appropriate for adjudication in state
courts. This is an inappropriate basis for abstention where feder-
al jurisdiction is properly invoked and none of the elements for
application of the Pullman abstention doctrine are present. °
Of course, many state constitutions contain provisions pro-
hibiting the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. 61 It can be argued, therefore, that a decision un-
der a state constitutional taking provision could "avoid or sub-
stantially modify" the federal constitutional question and thus
justify application of the Pullman abstention doctrine. Where,
however, a state constitutional provision is essentially the "mir-
ror" of its federal counterpart, both the United States Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit have
rejected application of the Pullman abstention doctrine.62
Abstention based upon the Thibodaux-Burford doctrine is
equally inapplicable to cases raising the issue of inverse condem-
nation. Thibodaux-Burford has been used with caution by the
Supreme Court and cited only sparingly in the Ninth Circuit. The
reason for this is the potential breadth of a doctrine which allows
abstention to avoid deciding "difficult questions of state law"
which are of overriding state concern or to avoid disrupting
"state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a
59. Fralin and Waldron, Inc. v. City of Martinsville, Va., 370 F. Supp. 185, 192
(W.D. Va. 1973) aff'd, 493 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1973); Muskegon Theatres, Inc. v. City
of Muskegon, 507 F.2d 199, 204-05 (6th Cir. 1974). See also, Maun v. City of
Sacramento, E.D. Cal., 574, 571 TJM; Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of
Laguna Beach, et al., 390 F. Supp. 1004 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
60. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), Canton v. Spokane School
District 81,498 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1974), M. J. Brock & Sons, Inc., v. City of Davis,
401 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Cal. 1975).
The United States Supreme Court recently held that a federal district court
may not refuse jurisdiction merely because it is "too busy." Thermtron Products,
Inc. v. Hermandorfor, 423 U.S. 336, 344 (1976).
61. See, 29 A CJS Eminent Domain § 3, n.28 (1976).
62. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Examining Board of
Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores De Otero, - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. 2264
(1976); Stephens v. Tielsch, 405 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1974).
matter of substantial public concern." 63 The potential for misuse
of such a doctrine has led the courts to restrict its application to
cases in which there is such an overwhelming state interest in the
litigation that a decision by the federal court would work an
undue or great hardship on the state involved.
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court has justified ab-
stention under the Thibodaux-Burford rule to avoid the necessi-
ty of a federal court decision regarding the scope of the eminent
domain law in the state of Louisiana where the provision in
question had never been interpreted by Louisiana courts' and to
avoid the necessity of a federal court determination of the right
of the state of New Mexico to allocate an extremely scarce
resource, namely, water. 65 As previously indicated, the similarity
between these cases and the Pullman decision is marked. The
only distinction is found in the fact that in these cases there was
no constitutional issue that could be avoided by adjudication in
the state courts.
Abstention under this doctrine has also been deemed appro-
priate to avoid disruption of state regulation of the Texas oil
fields 6 and to allow a state to determine its local needs with
respect to train services where those services are essential to the
economic well-being of the state.67 Emphasizing that abstention
under this rule is applicable only when the issues are of over-
whelming importance to the state, the United States Supreme
Court has ruled that, in cases in which Burford has been the
basis for abstention, the district court should dismiss the action
completely to allow resolution of all issues in the state courts.6
In cases involving the issue of inverse condemnation, however,
there is no overriding state interest to justify abstention based on
the Thibodaux-Burford doctrine. There is no state question in-
volved. An inverse condemnation action brought in federal court
presents questions based upon the fifth amendment prohibitions
against a taking without just compensation, with jurisdiction
founded upon the Federal Question Statute. 69 No state policy
with regard to inverse condemnation is involved. The question of
whether local govermnental action has precluded any reason-
63. Colorado River Water Conser. District v. United States, 424 U.S. at 814.
64. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
65. Kaiser Steel Corporation v. W. S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968).
66. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
67. Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Railway Co., 341 U.S.
341 (1951).
68. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943).
69. See Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
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able and beneficial use of the property in question is solely one of
fact under the fifth amendment. This is quite unlike the fact
situation in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux
where a federal court decision would have had the effect of
interpreting the scope of the Louisiana eminent domain laws and
thus of infringing upon what the United States Supreme Court
characterized as the "sovereign power of eminent domain. ' 70 A
federal court determination that a taking has occurred will not
disrupt the efforts of the state "to establish a coherent policy with
respect to a matter of substantial public concern. "71 Again, the
question of whether a taking has occurred is solely one of fact. A
determination that property has been taken and that compensa-
tion is required does not disrupt some coherent state policy
unless it is argued that a state has the right to establish a policy
with respect to inverse condemnation.
7 2
Application of the Thibodaux-Burford doctrine has been re-
jected in two cases involving municipal efforts to "downzone"
property so as to constitute a taking.73 The Texas eminent do-
70. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959).
Further complicating the situation is the apparent inconsistency between
Thibodaux and Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959),
decided the same day. Allegheny County was also a diversity action involving
the question of whether the taking of plaintiff's property under the power of
eminent domain for an airport enlargement was improper as constituting a
taking for private use as opposed to public use. In Allegheny County the Court
refused to apply the abstention doctrine using a Pullman analysis. The apparent
inconsistency between the two decisions has been the subject of considerable law
review commentary. See Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases, 122 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1071, 1148-1153 (1974); Kurland, Toward a Cooperative Judicial Federalism:
The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 FRD 481 (1959); See also, C. Wright,
Law of Federal Courts, (2d ed. 1973).
71. Colorado River Water Conser. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. at 814.
72. In Colorado River Water Conser. Dist., Id. at 816, the Supreme Court
noted that the Thibodaux and W. S. Ranch Co. decisions based federal jurisdic-
tion upon diversity, whereas the Burford and Alabama Public Service Commis-
sion cases were federal question cases. The Court then opined that "[t]he pre-
sence of a federal basis for jurisdiction may raise the level of justification needed
for abstention." Colorado River Water Conser. Dist. v. United States, supra at 815,
n. 21.
73. See Lerner v. Town of Islip, 272 F. Supp. 664 (E.D. N.Y. 1967); Steel Hill
Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 335 F. Supp. 947 (D. N.H. 1971),
plaintiffs made no allegations concerning the construction of state law or clarity
of local ordinances, and did not indicate whether or not there was a comprehen-
sive state regulatory system which demonstrated state policy in the field. Conse-
quently, there were no preliminary state issues to litigate. Plaintiffs' sole conten-
tion was that the amended zoning ordinances were unconstitutional as applied to
main statutes were not deemed sufficiently analogous to a state-
wide regulatory system of natural resources preservation to
justify application of Burford abstention.74 Finally, no complex
state regulatory scheme was found in an action challenging the
procedure for release of a pre-judgment attachment of bank
funds on the grounds of taking property without due process of
law, improper reading of the applicable statute and denial of
equal protection.75
CONCLUSION
The ability of government to tie up land in a Gordian knot of
regulation and inaction places an undue burden upon landown-
ers which was not contemplated by the framers of the Constitu-
tion. The injustice of compelling an individual to shoulder too
great a share of a burden properly belonging to the community as
a whole has long been recognized. In such situations, courts have
consistently noted that such an individual should be compen-
sated or the burden should be removed. 76 The federal courts have
always stood ready to provide a remedy for the imposition of
such unequal burdens. For them to now refuse landowners ac-
cess would be a grave injustice. The court in Joiner v. City of
Dallas77 recognized that
Abstention is a formidable doctrine in the federal forum comprised of
medusan components that, absent the most meticulous inspection, will
transfix and render powerless both litigants and jurists. Its application
should be grounded upon fixed principles, strictly applied to the facts
of the federal litigation, for an equally formidable doctrine obligates
the federal judiciary as much to exercise jurisdiction properly invoked
as to dismiss a proceeding where jurisdiction is wanting. Abstention
must rest on sound jurisprudential underpinnings; it must not be a
label for a visceral aversion to our Article III obligation to adjudicate. 78
their property. It was held abstention would be impermissible because this single
constitutional issue could not be eliminated by deference to state courts.
74. See Joiner v. City of Dallas, 380 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Texas 1974), aff'd. 419
U.S. 1042 (1974). Defendant posed the argument that the eminent domain statute
was in the nature of a state-wide regulatory system which would be disrupted by
a premature federal court holding since the state had not yet formulated its
policy. The court held abstention was unwarranted where plaintiff did not take
issue with state law and defendant could not establish a comprehensive state-
wide regulatory system.
75. Liquifin Aktiengeselischaft v. Brennan, 260 U.S. 93 (1922). Pursuant to
levy on an order of attachment the sheriff of the City of New York charged
plaintiff with fees and expenses as provided for by statute. These payments were
contested as an unconstitutional taking of personal property without due process
of law. Since scrutiny of the statute could only result in a reduction and not
complete exoneration of liability, and since no state-wide regulatory scheme was
found, the constitutional infirmities remained vital and abstention was
inapposite.
76. Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 93 (1922).
77. 380 F. Supp. 754, 763 (N..D. Texas 1974).
78. Id.
